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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EST)

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: A Viet Cong company early yesterday attacked a Regional Forces outpost near the provincial capital of Quang Ngai, capturing nine weapons and inflicting casualties of eight killed and five wounded among government defenders. However, subsequent government airstrikes and naval gunfire directed on the attackers killed 33 Viet Cong, with an additional 30 estimated to have been killed and carried away.

Twelve B-52 Stratofortresses yesterday launched the third attack in three days against a suspected Viet Cong base camp in Tay Ninh Province, 30 miles northwest of Saigon. Three Vietnamese battalions are now engaged in a ground follow-up operation.

In the delta area south of Saigon, government forces yesterday reportedly captured a Viet Cong sampan containing several hundred pounds of ammunition and explosives.

The Political Situation in South Vietnam: In an assessment of the Ky government's first four months in office, the US Embassy comments that South Vietnam's political and administrative fabric is still weak even though overall military and political conditions have improved during the year. 7

Critics of the government are now pointing to unsolved problems, particularly in the complex economic sphere, as a means of attacking the regime. There is some danger that resulting criticism of certain cabinet members, plus ever present coup rumors, may once again encourage many Vietnamese to look for a quick change in the government as a solution to present problems. 7 (continued) 1

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India-Pakistan: Clashes have increased along the cease-fire line recently but there is no firm evidence that either side intends to launch major military moves.

On 2 November UN Secretary General Thant issued a report indicating stepped-up military activity by both sides, including patrolling beyond the ceasefire line. Repeated overflights by both Pakistani and Indian military aircraft are also tending to increase tension. US observers in New Delhi, however, discount Pakistani reports that India is massing troops for a major offensive along the southern end of the cease-fire line.

the citizens of both countries continue to believe that their respective armed forces proved their superiority in the recent fighting. Public opinion, encouraged by strongly nationalistic newspapers, appears firmly opposed to any compromise on basic issues between the two nations.

The US Embassy in Karachi notes, however, that among Pakistani government leaders and intelligentsia there is a developing awareness of the country's growing military inferiority to India. This appears to have stimulated a recognition on the part of some Pakistanis of the need to re-establish close relations with the US. It may also account for the relative moderation of recent speeches by President Ayub, in which he stressed the need for peace with India.

The UN Security Council is still unable to obtain unanimous agreement on a resolution calling for strict observance of the cease-fire and early withdrawal of the opposing armies to positions held prior to 5 August. Disagreement has arisen over Soviet and French attempts to insert in the resolution a provision requiring another Security Council vote to extend the present UN observer mission along the cease-fire line beyond the initial three-month period. Γ

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Philippines: The campaign for the elections on 9 November is in high gear but there is still no indication of a pronounced swing toward either of the two major presidential candidates.

Both incumbent President Diosdado Macapagal of the Liberal Party (LP) and Ferdinand Marcos of the Nacionalista Party (NP) are pro-Western. In the absence of fundamental policy differences, they are devoting themselves largely to lively personal exchanges, with Macapagal displaying less restraint.

Macapagal has compared his opponent to Batista and warned that the Philippines under his leadership would become another Cuba "with Communism and chaos." Commenting on a recent explosion on his presidential launch, Macapagal implicated Marcos by charging that he was "capable of anything, literally." The Nacionalistas, in turn, have labeled the incident a "sickening and expensive administration trick." Some LP experts have conceded privately that Macapagal's wild attacks on Marcos may be working to his disadvantage.

Senator Gerardo Roxas of the LP is expected to win the vice presidency over NP Senator Fernando Lopez, and the LP is given the edge in the contest for all 104 House seats. Only 8 of 24 Senate seats are at stake, and neither of the two major parties is expected to win enough for a majority in that body. This will limit the winner's ability to implement the social and economic reforms that are essential to the country's long-range stability.

Philippine election campaigns normally are attended by violence. Thus far in this campaign 30 persons have been killed. To forestall further violence, the constabulary, placed on partial alert on 2 November, will advance to full alert on 7 November. The armed forces are also prepared to take action if necessary.

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NOTES

Burundi: The King's departure for Europe on 2 November may have set the stage for an attempt by extremist anti-Western Tutsi elements to seize control of the government. A moderate Tutsi group, backed by some of the military, is opposed to such a takeover, but its strength is uncertain and may depend on the King's willingness to support it. Hutu-Tutsi tribal disorders may also occur. although the Hutu majority is now virtually leaderless and probably would react only slowly. If the extremists win, it seems certain that the Chinese Communists--expelled from Bujumbura last January--will be invited back, and that the current anti-American campaign will be stepped up. /

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Sudan: Khartoum's shaky coalition of the ruralbacked and generally conservative Umma and the urban National Union Party (NUP) may be patched up again. The NUP ministers who resigned last week have offered to rejoin the government if they are assigned more important cabinet posts and if NUP leader Azhari is allowed to head any Sudanese delegation to future regional summit meetings. Umma leaders may accept these conditions in principle, but negotiations between the two parties could break

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down at any time.

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	Israel: Preliminary returns from the 2 November Knesset (Parliament) election indicate that Prime Minister Eshkol's two-party moderate socialist "Alignment" will be able to form a new coalition government. The new Rafi party of former prime minister Ben-Gurion has apparently won only about 10 out of the 120 seats. Eshkol will probably have to include the extreme socialist Mapam party in the new coalition, which may necessitate some concessions in domestic economic affairs. However, Israel's pro-Western foreign policy and its tough stand vis-a-vis the Arabs will not be affected.	25X
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	USSR: Party First Secretary Brezhnev apparently	
	[now]occupies the post of "Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces" in the USSR. He told	
	Danish Premier Krag in Moscow last month that he is chairman of the Soviet Defense Council, the highest Soviet military policy body. Brezhnev was also recently identified as chairman of the RSFSR bureau, and it thus appears that he holds all positions held by Khrushchev except that of premier.	25X
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